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Brian Rubin and Brit Simon Obtained a Unanimous Defense Verdict in Pima County in October 2019

Brian Rubin and Brit Simon obtained a unanimous defense verdict in an October 19, 2019 trial in Pima County. The case involved a motor vehicle accident with disputed liability. Plaintiff sued the Thomas Rubin & Kelly client and asked for almost double the pre-trial offer from the insurer. The jury returned with a unanimous defense verdict in less than thirty minutes.

Revisiting McReynolds

Avoiding Bad Faith When There Are Multiple Competing Claims in Excess of the Liability Policy Limits

In 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the legitimacy of bad faith claims asserted against an insurer who files an interpleader action after it is unable to resolve a dispute arising out of multiple claims in excess of the available policy limits. In McReynolds v. Am. Commerce Ins. Co., 225 Ariz. 125, 235 P.3d 278 (App. 2010), the defendant was insured under a policy with liability limits of $25,000. After a dispute arose between plaintiff’s counsel and the treating hospital over the satisfaction of a medical lien, plaintiff served an offer of judgement for the policy limits on the insurer. Instead of responding to the offer of judgment, however, the insurer promptly filed an interpleader action and paid the $25,000 policy limits into the court. The Court of Appeals found that had the insurer accepted the offer of judgment, it would have “left the insurer and the insured exposed to a claim by the lienholder after having already paid out the available monies under the policy.”  Because acceptance of the offer of judgment “would not have extinguished the liability of the insured,” the Court found that the insurer did not act in bad faith when it filed the interpleader and continued to provide a defense for the insured. 

Within its holding in McReynolds v. American Commerce Insurance Co., the Court determined that when handling multiple claims in excess of policy limits, the insurer can insulate itself from bad faith claims by the (1) prompt, good faith filing of an interpleader as to all known claimants; with (2) payment of the policy limits into the court; and (3) the continued provision of a defense for the insured as to each pending claim. According to the Court, this acts as a “safe harbor” against a subsequent bad faith claim for failing to properly manage the policy limits or to give equal consideration to multiple settlement offers in excess of the applicable policy limits.  In sum, so long as the insurer promptly files the interpleader in good faith and continues to provide a defense for its insured, it cannot be subjected to bad faith claims arising out of its actions.

The McReynolds holding remains the law in Arizona. However, its limits have been subjected to multiple attacks by attorneys attempting to avoid interpleader or the safe harbor created by the filing of an interpleader by the insurance carrier.  In one Pinal County case the trial court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that a question of fact existed as to whether the insurer made a genuine good faith effort to settle all claims before interpleading the policy limits.  In particular, the insurer never offered to coordinate or pay for a mediation before filing the interpleader.  Since whether an insurer fails to properly investigate, evaluate, and/or settle claims is generally an issue of fact for the jury, the question of whether the insurer was protected by the McReynolds safe harbor could not be dispensed by a motion for summary judgment. It is important to note that this was merely a trial court holding and does not abrogate the holding of McReynolds in any way. However, it has become clear that some courts may take issue with the idea that insurers can protect themselves from bad faith claims by filing interpleaders as soon as they are faced with multiple competing claims in excess of the policy limits. The better course of action may be for insurers to first attempt a pro rata settlement of the available policy limits, or to facilitate settlement discussions by arranging for a private mediation.

Some attorneys have also argued that the McReynolds safe harbor does not apply if the insurer does not promptly pay the policy limits into the court with the filing of the interpleader.  However, this argument may be avoided by affirmatively requesting an order from the trial court directing the insurer to deposit the policy limits with the clerk of court. The Arizona Court of Appeals has not yet weighed in on this issue, but it is something that should be considered when filing an interpleader action.    

When dealing with multiple claims in excess of the policy limits, insurers must be diligent to ensure they are giving equal consideration to their insureds, while taking the steps necessary to ensure they will be protected by the safe harbor created in McReynolds. With proper strategy, insurers can protect themselves from liability for bad faith claims while hopefully protecting their insureds from excess exposure by facilitating the global settlement of all claims. The attorneys at Thomas, Rubin & Kelley have extensive experience with respect to handling matters that involve numerous claimants and interpleader actions. Please feel free to contact us if you need assistance with any of your Arizona claims. 

Arizona's Insurance Requirements for Rideshare Services

Rideshare services like Uber, Lyft, and TotalRide have changed the way people travel. At the push of a button, a person can request a total stranger to drive them almost anywhere they want, including work, school, sporting events, and concerts.  There are even stories of professional athletes using such services to get to games.  Given the amount of rideshare service companies in Arizona, the Arizona legislature has passed laws which require strict background searches and larger liability insurance policy limits.

Under Arizona law, rideshare service companies are referred to as “transportation network companies.” When a transportation network company driver is available to accept rides, but has not yet accepted a ride request, they are required to have a motor vehicle liability policy which provides coverage in the amount of $25,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per accident for bodily injury, along with $20,000.00 per accident for property damage. After the driver has accepted a ride request, though, they are required to have primary commercial motor vehicle insurance coverage in the amount of $250,000.00 per incident, as well as commercial uninsured motorist coverage in the minimum amount of $250,000.00 per incident.

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 28-4038, recognizes some drivers may not notify their automobile insurance carrier that they are driving for a transportation network company. As such, unless an insurance policy expressly provides coverage or contains an amendment or an endorsement which expressly provides coverage, the driver’s insurance policy is not required to provide coverage while the driver is logged in or providing transportation network services. However, insurance companies may still provide such coverage to their insureds by selling an endorsement to an existing motor vehicle liability insurance policy.

Transportation network company drivers are subject to criminal background checks and a review of their driver history report. They are also required to have at least one annual brake and tire inspection performed by a qualified third party.  If a person has more than three (3) moving violations or one (1) major violation in the preceding three (3) years, they are ineligible to be a driver for a transportation network company. Transportation network companies are also required by law to implement a zero-tolerance policy on the use of drugs and alcohol. Assuming the transportation network company has done a good job of vetting its applicants, transportation network company drivers may be attractive customers for some insurance carriers.

If your insured is involved in an accident it is always important to determine if they were in the course and scope and their employment at the time of the accident. This includes assessing whether they were working for a rideshare service type company. As discussed above, this may affect the amount of available insurance coverage, trigger exclusions, or provide another source of recovery for injured claimants.

Thomas Rubin & Kelley has extensive experience dealing with automobile insurance coverage issues and the defense of professional drivers. Please call us if you need assistance with any of your Arizona claims.

Medical Payments Coverage is Subject to Health Care Provider Liens

In a recent decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals decided as a matter of first impression that medical payments coverage in an automobile policy is subject to health care provider liens. Dignity Health v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2019 Ariz. App. LEXIS 566, 2019 WL 2428645 (filed June 11, 2019). In Dignity Health, Farmers’ insured was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Mercy Gilbert Medical Center. The hospital recorded a health care provider lien for more than $140,000.00 pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-931. Farmers paid its insured $99,000.00 in medical payments coverage without satisfying the lien. The hospital filed an action to enforce the lien, but Farmers successfully moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, arguing that the payment to its insured was not subject to the lien. On appeal, the Court examined the health care provider lien statute and held that the lien was valid and enforceable against medical payments coverage. This holding was based upon the wording of the statue which only excludes “health insurance and underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage” from health care provider liens. A.R.S. § 33-931.

Health care provider liens extend “to all claims of liability or indemnity, except health insurance and underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage as defined in § 20-259.01, for damages accruing to the person to whom the services are rendered . . . on account of the injuries that gave rise to the claims and that required the services.” A.R.S. § 33-931. The Court found the statute clearly and unequivocally only excluded health insurance, uninsured motorist coverage, and underinsured motorist coverage from a health care provider’s lien.  Had the legislature intended to exempt medical payments coverage from the reach of a health care provider lien, it would have specifically stated so in the statute.

Automobile insurers must ensure all liens are appropriately addressed when paying a settlement or judgment. While a Petition for Review is pending before the Arizona Supreme Court, the Dignity Health opinion requires insurers to address health care provider liens when paying first party medical payments claims. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-934, the health care provider may recover reasonable attorney’s fees from the insurer if it files an action to enforce its lien. Thomas Rubin & Kelley routinely assists Arizona insurance companies with developing best practices for handling health care provider liens. If you need legal assistance on any of your Arizona claims, or have questions regarding Arizona health care provider liens, please do not hesitate to contact us.                  

Arizona Governor Signs Law Mandating Increased Minimum Auto Liability Coverage

After 40 plus years of clamoring by various special interest groups to raise the minimum statutory limits from $15,000 per person / $30,000 per accident / $10,000 property damage per accident, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey finally signed legislation that will require vehicle owners to purchase policies that provide for at least $25,000 / $50,000 / $15,000 in coverage. As you may recall, this legislation made it all the way to the Governor last year. However, the Governor vetoed the bill at that time. Previously, the Governor expressed concern as to how higher liability limits may increase costs for those at the bottom of the income scale and how this may result in massive numbers of low-income individuals becoming uninsured. The 2019 legislation scaled back the proposed property damage coverage from $25,000 to $15,000 per accident. This apparently assuaged some of the Governor’s concern from last year. This law applies to policies that are issued or are renewed beginning July 1, 2020.

Please contact Brian Rubin directly at (602) 604-7509 or BRubin@TRKFirm.com if you have any questions or would like to discuss this development further.

Significant Changes to Laws Relating to Residential Construction Liability in Arizona

In April 2019, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey signed a bill which makes a number of substantial changes to the existing law related to residential construction. Portions of this particular bill were sought following an Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in 2017.  See Amberwood Development, Inc. v. Swans Grading, Inc., 2017 WL 711269 (App. 2017).  In the Amberwood matter, the Arizona Court of Appeals found a subcontractor could be responsible for indemnity broader than its scope of work and without any finding of fault if the contract did not expressly limit its risk in that fashion. The above-referenced bill signed by Governor Ducey creates a new statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159.01.  This particular statute will no longer allow the result reached in Amberwood.

The first important portion of the statute voids broad indemnification agreements as against public policy.  Specifically, the statute expressly prohibits any provision which “purports to insure, to indemnify, or hold harmless the promisee from or against liability for loss or damage resulting from the negligence of the promisee or the promisee’s indemnitees, employees, subcontractors, consultants or agents other than the promisor.”  Based on this section of the statute, a subcontractor’s indemnity is now limited only to the extent of its own negligent workmanship.  See A.R.S. § 32-1159.01(A).

Although broad indemnification agreements are now void as against public policy as described in the preceding paragraph, the statute still notes the duty to defend can still apply to claims arising out of or relating to a contracting party’s work.  Thus, the duty to defend would still presumably attach to any claims arising out of the subcontractor’s work. 

The bill also revised certain components of Arizona’s Purchaser Dwelling Act.  Specifically, the legislature reinstated A.R.S. § 12-1364 which allows for the recovery of attorneys’ fees.  Under this reinstated provision, the Court may now award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.  A homeowner will be deemed to be the prevailing party “if the relief obtained by the purchaser for that contested issue, exclusive of any fees and taxable costs, is more favorable than the repairs or replacements and offers made by the seller” before the purchaser filed the dwelling action.” If the relief obtained is not more favorable, the seller will be considered the prevailing party.

In addition, the legislation will allow for subcontractor participation in a purchaser dwelling action.  Specifically, the relevant statute will now require the general contractor to promptly forward any PDA Notice to the subcontractors that worked on the residence.  After that, the subcontractor will be provided with the right to inspect, test, and repair the property.

The legislation also modifies the procedure of bringing a third-party claim.  Under the new statutory scheme, the statutes of limitation of repose are now tolled from the date the general contractor receives a Purchaser Dwelling Act Notice until nine months after a civil suit or arbitration demand is served upon it.  See A.R.S. § 12-1363(G). Once suit is filed, subcontractors must be joined as third-party defendants if feasible and subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure.  Should the matter proceed to trial, a judge or jury (finder of fact) must determine: (1) if a construction defect exists; and (2) the amount of damages caused by the defect; and (3) each subcontractor whose conduct, whether by action or omission, may have caused, in whole or in part, any construction defect.  See A.R.S. § 12-1362(D).

Subcontractors in Arizona have long sought proportional liability and other remedies related to risk transfer. The new legislation should provide for subcontractors to receive what they were seeking. In essence, contractors and designers higher in the contractual chain will potentially bear more financial responsibility for their role in construction defects, and will no longer be able to look to minimally involved subcontractors for significant contribution when it comes to indemnification.

Arizona Now Requires Hands-Free Cell Phone Use While Driving

On April 22, 2019, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey signed legislation which requires the use of hands-free electronic devices while driving. HB2318, which is codified as A.R.S. § 28-914, makes it illegal to drive while holding a “portable wireless communication device” or a “stand-alone electronic device.” “Portable wireless communication devices” include cell phones, satellite phones, text-messaging devices, personal digital assistants, computers, and GPS devices. However, it does not include radios or in-vehicle navigation systems. “Stand-alone electronic device” includes any portable device capable of writing, sending, or reading any text-based communication, including text messages, instant messages, emails or internet data.

The new law still allows drivers to hold their cell phones while parked or stopped at a red light or railroad crossing. Drivers can also hold their cell phones to report illegal activity or call 911. There is also an exception for devices which are “permanently or temporarily affixed” to the motor vehicle to relay information between a professional driver and a dispatcher, including cell phones used by transportation network services like Uber and Lyft. Drivers may also continue to use earpieces, headphone devices, and smart watches. This includes speaking into a smart watch to make a phone call or send a text message.

The legislature also amended A.R.S. § 28-963 which prohibits watching a broadcast television image or a visual image while driving. The statute now specifically bans watching a video or movie on a cell phone or electronic device. The amendment also bans the recording or broadcasting of a video on a cell phone or electronic device, even though it does allow use of such devices “for the sole purpose of continuously recording or broadcasting video within or outside of the motor vehicle.”

While the statewide ban goes into effect immediately, officers may not issue citations for using a cell phone or text messaging while driving until January 1, 2021. Until then, officers are only allowed to issue a warning. Despite the delay in enforcement of the new state law, several Arizona cities have already passed distracted driving laws, and officers in those cities can continue to issue citations for violation of local laws at any time. For example, Tempe, Glendale, Surprise, Phoenix and Tucson all have local ordinances which restrict cell phone use while driving.

Thomas, Rubin & Kelley PC regularly defends cases which involve the alleged use of cell phones while driving. Please contact us if you have questions regarding Arizona’s motor vehicle laws, or need assistance with any of your Arizona motor vehicle accident cases.

Dram Shop Law in Arizona

Liability for the “Poor Decisions” of Obviously Intoxicated Individuals

It is important for Arizona bar and restaurant owners, as well as those who insure them, to understand the risks associated with intoxicated patrons and what is known as “dram shop liability.”  The majority of dram shop cases involve bar patrons becoming involved in motor vehicle accidents after being served liquor past the point of intoxication. Since “it is well known that highly intoxicated people make poor decisions,” bar and restaurant owners have a duty to not serve obviously intoxicated individuals. See Patterson v. Thunder Pass, Inc., 214 Ariz. 435, 153 P.3d 1064 (App. 2007).  However, as set forth below, bar owners are not subject to unlimited liability, and Arizona courts recognize that bar owners should not be liable for the unforeseeable and extraordinary actions of their intoxicated patrons. 

In 1983, the Arizona Supreme Court held in Ontiveros v. Borak that a tavern owner is under a duty, imposed both by common law principles and statute, to exercise affirmative, reasonable care in serving intoxicants to patrons who might later injure themselves or an innocent third party, whether on or off the premises. If a tavern owner breaches that duty of reasonable care, the owner may be held liable for injuries or damages caused by his or her negligence. The legislature in Arizona later codified the Ontiveros ruling with A.R.S. § 4-311(a) which provides that a licensee is liable for property damage and personal injuries if a trier of fact finds that: (1) the licensee sold spirituous liquor to a purchaser who was obviously intoxicated; (2) the purchaser consumed the spirituous liquor sold by the licensee; and (3) the consumption of the spirituous liquor was a proximate cause of the injury or property damage.

In very limited circumstances, it is possible for a bar or restaurant owner to escape liability if it can prove that there was a superseding, intervening cause of the injury.   To constitute such a relieving cause, the intervening event must have been unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the bar or restaurant owner and, when looking back after the event, the intervening event must appear extraordinary. Therefore, if an injury is produced by a cause which is both intervening and superseding, even though the original negligence may have been a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, the bar or restaurant owner is not legally responsible for the injury. 

For example, in the 2007 case Patterson v. Thunder Pass Inc., an obviously intoxicated bar patron was observed by employees backing her vehicle into a parked Jeep and then driving forward over a parking block. A bar employee confiscated her keys and called a taxicab to transport her home.  When the taxicab did not show, another employee drove her home and returned her keys. Less than an hour later the intoxicated patron returned to bar, retrieved her vehicle, and drove the wrong way at a high rate of speed before colliding head-on with another vehicle.  The driver and passenger in the other vehicle brought a dram shop case against the bar owner arguing that the bar had a duty to not serve an obviously intoxicated patron, and it did not extinguish its liability merely by driving the customer home.  The Court held that the bar was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that the patron’s decision to return that night to retrieve her vehicle while she was still intoxicated was unforeseeable and extraordinary, and thus constituted a superseding, intervening event of independent origin that negated any negligence on the part of the bar or its employees.

If a bar or restaurant that you insure is faced with a dram shop liability suit, the potential for liability is high based on Arizona statutes. However, with a proper defense strategy involving early identification of possible intervening superseding causes, you may be able to significantly limit, or possibly eliminate, your insured’s liability.

Thomas Rubin & Kelly has significant experience in evaluating and defending dram shop liability cases. Please feel free to contact us if you need assistance with any of your Arizona claims.

Automatic Assignment of Bodily Injury Claims Under Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Laws

When dealing with a Claimant who has received workers’ compensation benefits, there are two issues which typically arise: 

(1) What is the amount of the workers’ compensation lien?  and 

(2) Has the claim been assigned to the workers’ compensation carrier?

Both of these questions can be answered by reviewing A.R.S. § 23-1023, Arizona’s statute which addresses the liability of tortfeasors to injured employees. 

The statute states:

23-1023. Liability of Third person to injured employee; election of remedies

A. If an employee who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is injured or killed or further aggravates a previously accepted industrial injury by the negligence or wrong of another person not in the same employ, the injured employee, or in event of death the injured employee's dependents, may pursue the injured person's remedy against the other person.

B. If the employee who is entitled to compensation under this chapter or the employee's dependents do not pursue a remedy pursuant to this section against the other person by instituting an action within one year after the cause of action accrues, or if after instituting the action, the employee or the employee's dependents fail to fully prosecute the claim and the action is dismissed, the claim against the other person is deemed assigned to the insurance carrier or self-insured employer and all of the following apply:

1. The insurance carrier or self-insured employer may institute an action against the other person.

2. Any dismissal that is entered for lack of prosecution of an action instituted by the employee or the employee's dependents shall not prejudice the right of the insurance carrier or self-insured employer to recover the amount of benefits paid.

3. If the statute of limitations of the claim is one year after the cause of action accrues, the insurance carrier or self-insured employer may file the action prior to one year after the cause of action accrues.

4. The claim may be prosecuted or compromised by the insurance carrier or the person liable for the self-insured employer or may be reassigned in its entirety to the employee or the employee's dependents. After the reassignment, the employee who is entitled to compensation, or the employee's dependents, shall have the same rights to pursue the claim as if it had been filed within the first year.

C. The employee or the employee's dependents shall provide the insurance carrier or the self-insured
employer written notice of the intention to bring an action against a third party and shall provide to the insurance carrier or self-insured employer timely and periodic notice of all pleadings and rulings concerning the status of the pending action. In any action instituted by the employee or the employee's dependents, the insurance carrier or the self-insured employer shall have the right to intervene at any time to protect the insurance carrier's or the self-insured employer's interests.

D. If the employee proceeds against the other person, compensation and medical, surgical and hospital benefits shall be paid as provided in this chapter and the insurance carrier or other person liable to pay the claim shall have a lien on the amount actually collectable from the other person to the extent of such compensation and medical, surgical and hospital benefits paid. This lien shall not be subject to a collection fee. The amount actually collectable shall be the total recovery less the reasonable and necessary expenses, including attorney fees, actually expended in securing the recovery. In any action arising out of an aggravation of a previously accepted industrial injury, the lien shall only apply to amounts expended for compensation and treatment of the aggravation. The insurance carrier or person shall contribute only the deficiency between the amount actually collected and the compensation and medical, surgical and hospital benefits provided or estimated by this chapter for the case. Compromise of any claim by the employee or the employee's dependents at an amount less than the compensation and medical, surgical and hospital benefits provided for shall be made only with written approval of the insurance carrier or self-insured employer liable to pay the claim.

E. For purposes of this section, the commission shall have the same rights as an insurance carrier or
self-insured employer.

By its plain language, subsection D of the statute establishes that a workers’ compensation carrier has a lien on the amount of any settlement or judgment paid to the injured employee. To make sure this occurs, subsection C of the statute requires the employee to provide written notice of her intent to bring a lawsuit against a third-party tortfeasor, and provide the insurance carrier with timely and periodic notice of all rulings in the lawsuit. If the workers’ compensation carrier chooses to do so, it also has the right to intervene in the lawsuit. Workers’ compensation carriers in Arizona typically choose not to intervene in the lawsuit, as they simply enforce their lien by providing notice of the same to the claimant. It is not uncommon for a workers’ compensation carrier to never provide written notice to the tortfeasor that a lien applies to the settlement, so it is important to determine if such a lien applies by reviewing how the medical bills are paid, or requesting this information from the claimant or the claimant’s attorney.

A more interesting development occurs when the injured employee fails to file a lawsuit within one year of the accident. Pursuant to subsection B of the statute, the entire bodily injury claim “is deemed assigned to the insurance carrier or self-insured employer.” Prior versions of the statue did not contain such strict assignment language. When the statute was amended in 2007 the legislature deleted the “shall be deemed assigned” language in its entirety from the statute. This resulted in the Arizona Court of Appeals issuing a now defunct decision in Acosta v. Kiewit-Sundt. In that case, the Court held that even though the injured employee had waited more than one year after the injury to file lawsuit, the claim not barred because the statute no longer automatically assigned the claim to the workers’ compensation carrier. The legislature was paying attention, though, and shortly after this decision amended the statute to its current version which includes a specific directive that the claim is deemed assigned to the workers’ compensation carrier if the injured employee does not a file lawsuit within one year after the cause of action accrues. As long as the workers’ compensation benefits were paid after the amendment of the statute in 2014, the current version of the statute applies, and the employee is required to bring a lawsuit within one year to avoid having the claim being automatically assigned to workers’ compensation carrier.

Even though the injured employee’s claim may have been assigned to the workers’ compensation carrier, the statute still permits the carrier to file a lawsuit against the tortfeasor. The workers’ compensation carrier may also reassign the claim in its entirety to the injured employee, thus negating the effect of the one-year limitation set forth in subsection B of the statute. As such, if a lawsuit is filed more than one year after the
injury occurred, it is important for defense counsel to conduct discovery on whether the workers’ compensation carrier has re-assigned the claim to the injured employee. If there has been no reassignment, a motion to dismiss should be filed.

One recent Arizona Supreme Court decision has confirmed that injured employees must bring their lawsuit within one year of the accident to avoid having the claim being automatically assigned to the workers’
compensation carrier. In Jackson v. Eagle KMC L.L.C. (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jan. 2, 2019), the court recognized that “if a person entitled to compensation under Arizona workers’ compensation laws does not file an action against a third person who caused the injury within one year of the action accruing, the action is deemed assigned to the employer or the workers’ compensation insurer.” However, the court ultimately held that the statute did
not apply because the Plaintiff’s benefits were paid and administered in Nebraska. Since Nebraska does not have an automatic assignment provision, the Plaintiff was entitled to maintain her claim against the tortfeasor.

It is important to conduct an early evaluation of any claim involving a claimant whose medical expenses have been paid by workers’ compensation. If it has been more than one year since the injury occurred, the injured employee would be barred from bringing the lawsuit unless there has been reassignment of the claim by the workers’ compensation carrier. If there has been reassignment of the claim, insurers and their defense counsel need to be aware that the workers’ compensation carrier has a lien which may apply to any settlement or judgment obtained by the Plaintiff.

Thomas Rubin & Kelley has extensive experience in defending cases involving injured employees, including the proper handling of workers’ compensation liens. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you need
assistance with any of your Arizona claims.