by: Michael Kelley
The family purpose doctrine was first adopted in Arizona in 1919 when the Arizona Supreme Court held that “a father who furnishes an automobile for the pleasure and convenience of the members of his family makes the use of the machine for the above purposes his affair or business, and that any member of the family driving the machine with the father's consent, either express or implied, is the father's agent.” Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 278, 179 P. 966, 968 (1919). As explained by the court in Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz. App. 476, 479, 441 P.2d 73, 76 (1968), though, “[b]ecause of its insecure agency foundation, formulation of a universally applicable test of parental liability under the family purpose doctrine has proven difficult.” As such, the Arizona Court of Appeals set forth the following elements: (1) “there must be a family with sufficient unity so that there is a head of the family;” (2) “the motor vehicle responsible for the injury must have been one ‘furnished’ by the head of the family to a member of the family;” and (3) “this vehicle must have been used on the occasion in question by the family member with the implied or express consent of the head of the family for a family purpose.” Id. at 480, P.2d at 77.
The definition of a “family” has certainly changed over time. In 1984, the Arizona Court of Appeals that a “family” is “not limited to parents and their minor dependent children.” Brown v. Stogsdill, 140 Ariz. 485, 487, 682 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ct. App. 1984). The “family” is broadly defined as “a group of individuals living under one roof and usually under one head,” and may include independent adults living under the same roof, so long as “the family itself is a family unit with a family head.” Id. The question of whether someone is in a “family” may ultimately be a question of fact which needs to be decided by a jury. For example, in Brown, the court held that there was a question of fact as to whether the son was sufficiently emancipated to not be considered a member of his parents’ family unit, despite that fact that he paid room and board, and purchased the car with his own money. However, the court has recognized that not all relationships can create a “family” with respect to the family purpose doctrine. In Alosi v. Hewitt, 229 Ariz. 449, 450-52, 276 P.3d 518, 519-21 (Ct. App. 2012), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that consenting adults in a romantic relationship did not create liability under the family purpose doctrine. If fact, the court recognized that the family purpose doctrine “has not expanded beyond the parent-child relationship.” Id.
There have been many challenges to the family purpose doctrine over the years in Arizona, but all have failed. In Young v. Beck, 227 Ariz. 1, 3, 251 P.3d 380, 382 (2011), the parents argued that the family purpose doctrine should be abolished. In particular, the parents argued that under Arizona’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA"), they could not be jointly and severally liable for the actions of their son unless he was their agent or servant. However, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the legislature did not intend to abolish the family purpose doctrine with the enactment of UCATA. Instead, the court found that the family purpose doctrine was akin to vicarious liability, and “imputes liability not because of the head of the family's independent fault or breach of a legal duty, but because of “the agency relationship that is deemed to exist between the head of the household and the driver of the family car.” Id. at 5-6, 251 P.3d at 384-385.
The parents in Young also argued that the family purpose doctrine should be abolished because it “lacks a viable legal basis or public policy justification, is ‘grossly unfair to any parent [of] a young driver,’ and functions as ‘solely a penalty against wealthy parents.’” Id. at 6, 251 P.3d at 385. Relying upon the doctrine of stare decisis, the court denied this request as well. The court stated, “[t]he doctrine's primary justification is to provide ‘for an injured party's recovery from the financially responsible person - the family head - deemed most able to control to whom the car is made available.’” Id. Additionally, the family purpose doctrine was adopted with the public policy goal of providing compensation to accident victims and encouraging parents to ensure that their children operate motor vehicles safely. “Given the doctrine's long history, social utility in compensating injured victims, and conflicting policy considerations,” the court found “no compelling reason to abrogate the doctrine.” Id.
As it stands, the family purpose doctrine remains a viable legal doctrine in Arizona. If a parent allows their child to drive an automobile which is furnished, at least in part, by the parent, that parent will be vicariously liable for the negligent operation of that automobile. This is, perhaps, an over-simplification of the doctrine as there are nuances with respect to what constitutes a “family” or “household”, and whether the vehicle was actually “furnished” to the child for a “family purpose,” but the above analysis shows that Arizona courts will broadly interpret the doctrine to allow injured parties to be fully compensated.
Thomas Rubin & Kelley PC has extensive experience defending and evaluating automobile liability claims, including the application of the family purpose doctrine. Please feel free to reach out directly to Brian Rubin at brubin@trkfirm.com or Michael Kelley at mkelley@trkfirm.com with any of your questions. We are always happy to help.
